russian objectives in syria

However, the other cases that were considered in this report suggest that the conditions for intervention short of direct, overt use of the military, but greater than mere diplomacy, are more commonplace: The conflict in question presents a high level of threat to Russian security (as in Afghanistan), promises a high level of geopolitical benefit for Moscow (as in Libya), or demonstrates moderate levels of both (as in Syria pre-2015). Where and under what conditions could Russia intervene in other civil conflicts outside of post-Soviet Eurasia? Russia’s military will set up positions around the northeast Syrian town of Ain Issa as part of an agreement with the US-backed Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to reduce attacks from Turkish-controlled areas nearby. Indeed, the drivers for an intervention on a scale comparable to the 2015 action in Syria are absent in any of the other three countries examined in the report. Moscow has achieved its top-line military objectives in Syria — the defense of the Assad regime — and has shown that it has the resources to intervene in a third-party civil war. What were the drivers of the recent smaller-scale Russian interventions in conflicts such as Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, and Syria itself before 2015? In response to the media hype accompanying its recent military intervention in Syria, Moscow has once again reverted to talk of protecting the Syrian state and religious minorities against … 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW Russia’s strategic objectives provide the starting point for understanding its campaign design in Syria. Shortly after the operation began, Russian officials were cited as saying that, apart from fighting terrorist organisations such as the Islamic State, Russia′s goals included helping the Syrian government retake territory from various anti-government groups that are labelled by the United States and the American-led intervention in Syria as ″moderate opposition″, with a broader geopolitical objective being to roll back … n September 2015, Russia launched a series of airstrikes in Syria, marking the beginning of a significant and sustained military intervention.Many in the Western policy community were sur-prised by Russia’s actions. One of the objectives of Russia is to prevent the destruction of the Assad regime. In addition to the 2015 intervention in Syria, they examine four smaller-scale interventions in conflicts outside of Russia's immediate neighborhood: Libya, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Syria itself before 2015. The decision to intervene in Syria in 2015 resulted from an extraordinary confluence of political drivers and military-enabling factors. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. Three political factors emerge as primary drivers of the decision: the perception that an adverse military outcome—the collapse of the Assad regime—was imminent and that it could be prevented by intervening; the belief that this outcome would have had grave security implications; and the view that alternative means (e.g., diplomacy) had proven futile. After it failed to bring neighboring countries—in particular Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—together in a single alliance with Iran and the Syrian regime to confront the Islamic State, Russia has begun to send military reinforcements to Syria on its own. "Russia has several objectives i… Russia’s Interests. In 2013, the Syrian government signed a twenty-five-year contract with the Russian Soyuzneftegaz company for oil and gas drilling and exploration in an area off the Syrian coast. Russia’s 2015 National Security Strategy lists two specific strategic objectives applicable to Syria—the first is security by “strengthening the country’s defense,” and the second is focused on international recognition and national dignity by “consolidating the Russian Federation’s status as a leading world power, whose action… Some observers have attributed the Russian decision to intervene formally in Syria to a July 2015 visit to Moscow by General Qassem Soleimani, the late commander of the Quds Force of the IRGC, … RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Likewise, Tartus is its only military base beyond the territory of the former Soviet Union. In light of this military vulnerability, Russia hopes that increasing its military influence in Syria will give it the political leverage to get Assad to make genuine concessions in negotiations with the United States and regional countries—and ultimately reach a settlement that can fully safeguard Russian interests in Syria. There have been no further cruise missile strikes on jihadi positions in Syria from the Caspian Sea.The Russians have publicly ruled out Planners should always be cognizant of Russian interests in each country in the region and expect competition both for basing and for influence in those states where Moscow has made diplomatic and political-military inroads. Russia is unlikely to intervene on a scale comparable to the 2015 action in Syria in any of … Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience. • Ensure that the example of Syria reaffirms Russia’s claim to having a say in outcome of major Putin boldly pursues complex objectives in Syria Reviving Adana. Overall, this report concludes that Russia was relatively successful in achieving its main near-term political and military objectives in Syria, including preventing the collapse of the Assad regime (an important regional partner) and thwarting a possible U.S. attempt to overthrow Assad. by Stephen Lendman (stephenlendman.org – Home – Stephen Lendman)Russian aerial operations are smashing terrorists in Syria. Clearly, the principal objective of Russia’s Syria operation has been to turn the tide of the war and save the Moscow-friendly regime in Syria. Salam al-Saadi is a Palestinian-Syrian journalist and researcher focused on political and economic affairs in the Middle East, particularly in Syria. Russia has ports at Tartus and Latakia and a small airbase at Latakia. Russia—a country that relies heavily on the export of natural gas—is well aware of the importance of Syria’s location as a possible site for a network of oil and gas pipelines to Turkey and then Europe. Russia’s military alliance may have saved Syria from defeat, but the Arab nation still faces arduous challenges ahead, not least because of Western sanctions impeding reconstruction from war. The Syrian regime undermined Moscow’s efforts to form a national unity government in Syria by indicating their unwillingness and persecuting all opposition—even the internal opposition that called for dialogue with the Syrian government and maintained close ties with Russia. That threshold could plausibly be met in a variety of country settings, which suggests that there are likely to be more of these smaller-scale interventions in the future. Russia’s economy, largely driven by the oil and gas sectors. Furthermore, Russia’s military presence in Syria also serves long-term objectives related to its own expansionary military doctrine. Its Operation Plan, Objectives, and Consequences for the West’s Policies . The targets of the Russian airstrikes along with the ground offensive mounted by the Syrian Army supported by Hezbollah and Iranian forces indicate that Putin's immediate military objective appears to be to clear a coherent regime-held stronghold in what is commonly referred to as "Useful Syria" (suriya al-mufida) from Damascus up to Aleppo through Homs. Since the start of the Russian air strikes on 30 September Washington, DC 20036-2103. The deployment and use of Russian air forces in Syria could be a turning-point for Presi-dent Bashar al-Assad’s regime. It seems the Russians are serious about following up on such energy contracts, as evidenced by the mid-September visit of a Russian delegation of experts in the fields of oil and electricity to Damascus. According to many reports, Iranian leaders—nota- ... objectives. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page. “The Russian high command in Syria assured us it was not their people,” Defense Secretary Jim Mattis told senators in testimony last month. Russia hopes its recent military support to Bashar al-Assad will give it political leverage over the Syrian regime and counter Western military might both in Syria and globally. The Russian military campaign in Syria has now been underway for several weeks. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. What drives Russian leaders' decisionmaking on intervention? In May 2012, the Russian Orthodox Church and its primate Patriarch Kirill I were reported by the U.S. mainstream press to be supportive of the existing regime in Syria; the Church's leadership alluded to the potential threat to Christians in Syria that had comprised 10% of the country's population. Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. This set of circumstances is very unlikely to be replicated elsewhere. Putin began wide-ranging reforms to strengthen Russian military capabilities, including a $283 billion project to modernize the army’s military hardware. For his part, Syrian Minister of Petroleum Suleiman al-Abbas promised this delegation that “Russian companies will have a major role in the investment opportunities available in the future.”. The threshold for interventions of a smaller scale could plausibly be met in a variety of country settings, which suggests that there are likely to be more of these in the future. and Oliver Tamminga . Russia may have some strategic aims, such as, to re-take all the airports and secure supply links from the capital up to the Turkish border. CNN's Matthew Chance explains why Russia wants to maintain its strong presence in the Middle Eastern country. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. Candidate, Pardee RAND Graduate School, by Samuel Charap, Elina Treyger, Edward Geist. Russia’s Long-Term Aims in Syria. This article is a discussion of considerations such as this, and what is known about the strategic aims of Russia’s action in Syria. Markus Kaim. This threatens Russia’s own hegemony over the export of gas to the European continent (Russia’s share of total European gas imports exceeds 64 percent). The new Russian military action in Syria is partly a response to its exclusion from the U.S.-led international coalition to fight the Islamic State (IS). It Is Time to Transform U.S. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3180.html. Just two months ago, Russia also amended its naval military doctrine to prioritize confronting NATO. The research reported here was commissioned by USAFE-AFAFRICA A5/8/9 and conducted by the Strategy and Doctrine Program within RAND Project AIR FORCE. Measuring Wellbeing to Help Communities Thrive, Planning for the Rising Costs of Dementia, Assessing and Articulating the Wider Benefits of Research. Russian and US Objectives in Syria Worlds Apart. Charap, Samuel, Elina Treyger, and Edward Geist, Understanding Russia's Intervention in Syria. • Ensure that Russia’s reputation as a reliable protector of its allies (in the eyes of the latter) is not damaged by a forceful removal of Assad from power. In the same vein, Moscow has been stressing that it is not committed to preserving Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, but rather its recent strikes were an attempt to “avoid total disaster in Syria.” But Moscow has a vested interest in keeping Assad in power, and establishing a primary military presence in Syria gives it a foothold to rescue the Syrian regime if or when it faces the risk of collapse. Drawing upon decades of experience, RAND provides research services, systematic analysis, and innovative thinking to a global clientele that includes government agencies, foundations, and private-sector firms. Russia seems to be rushing towards investing in Syria’s energy sector because it would rather have a share in its energy development than compete with it. Putin has taken great care to present Russia’s military operation in Syria as a limited endeavor, undertaken solely for the purpose of ridding the world of the Islamic State. Could the Bioweapons Treaty Be Another Tool for Addressing Pandemics? Mental Health Care, The Doctor Will Call Me Maybe: The Uncertain Future Of Audio-Only Visits And Why We Need Them To Address Disparities. It quickly went further, appearing to target the “moderate” rebel groups in Syria, including the U.S.-backed Free Syrian Army, despite claims that all airstrikes are against the Islamic State. Syria’s Bashar al-Assad is Russia’s only ally in the Mediterranean. Intervention short of the direct, overt use of the military seen in Syria in 2015, but greater than mere diplomacy, requires that the conflict in question present a high level of threat (as in Afghanistan), promise significant geopolitical benefits (as in Libya), or demonstrate moderate levels of both (as in Syria pre-2015). Subscribe to the weekly Policy Currents newsletter to receive updates on the issues that matter most. In April, the Syrian regime obstructed the Moscow 1 and Moscow 2 conferences, which Russia organized to include the “constructive opposition” (the Syria-based opposition that does not demand Assad’s departure), by banning some of the invited opposition members from leaving the country. Russia hopes its recent military support to Bashar al-Assad will give it political leverage over the Syrian regime and counter Western military might both in Syria and globally. However, should the drivers that were present in Syria emerge, Russia is likely to increase its involvement. The authors of this report assess where and under what conditions Moscow could intervene again by analyzing the factors that drive Russian decisionmaking on intervention. Russia hopes to make Syria the centerpiece of its regional presence, but seeks to avoid engaging in reconstruction or nation-building there. 你将离开清华—卡内基中心网站，进入卡内基其他全球中心的网站。, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Several enabling military factors specific to Syria constituted necessary preconditions for the intervention: air access to the theater, permission to use ports and airbases, and the presence of allies on the ground. The Commander of Lebanon’s Armed Forces Has Made an Important Speech on the Country’s Economic Crisis, Slightly Dialing Back the Cynicism About Palestine’s Upcoming Elections, Carnegie–Tsinghua Young Ambassadors Program, Militias and the Future of the Iraqi State, Playing Politics with Poverty: Sisi’s COVID-19 Vaccine Strategy, The Banality of Authoritarian Control: Syria’s Ba’ath Party Marches On, The ICC in Palestine: Reasons to Withhold Hope. Russia’s Military Intervention in Syria . The analysis demonstrates that Moscow's decision to intervene in Syria in 2015 resulted from an extraordinary confluence of political drivers and military conditions. Russia has denied responsibility for the mass killing of civilians in Syria, insisting its air campaign in support of the Damascus regime is solely targeted against terrorist groups. According to official Syrian figures, trade between Russia and Syria amounted to about $1 billion in 2010, yet it rose to about $2 billion in 2011. That imperiled regime is Russia’s only real ally, and the only remaining partner in the Middle East. For example, in April the two sides officially announced plans to open agricultural trade through Tartus and Latakia. This, in conjunction with their propensity to construct or manipulate existing problems elsewhere, will allow Russia, Putin hopes, to exert influence over the global strategic agenda by destabilizing the current power balance. This is sure to be received negatively by Iran, which could interpret this message as a clear hint at its … Even though the fierce war raging in Syria has obstructed further commercial trade, both countries desire stronger economic relations. They do not deny that their country is en-gaged in more than setting up military bases. By using this website, you agree to our cookie policy. In this sense, the military expansion in Syria is part of a bigger Russian expansion that includes establishing military bases in several countries, including Vietnam, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Seychelles, Singapore, and Belarus. Russia’s attempts to address all the rival strategic agendas in Syria while advancing its own objectives hold questionable attainability. Until the end of September 2015 Russia continued to actively use diplomacy in its Middle East policy, consistently defending a multi-track approach and a diplomatic solution to the Syrian crisis. Syria was a Soviet client in the days of the Soviet Union; it is the only Soviet client in the area that Russia has managed to maintain. This could allow it to exploit newfound U.S flexibility on the fate of Assad, but only if it can deliver on U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s most important question: “We’re prepared to negotiate… Is Russia prepared to bring [Assad] to the table and actually find the solution to this violence?”. Getting Out of Forever Wars: What Are Biden's Options in Afghanistan? Assad’s ability to obstruct these initiatives shows how weak Russian influence is within the agencies of the Syrian regime. Russian forces, therefore, will remain in Syria, spending finite resources in ways that are less threatening to the United States than if they were used elsewhere in Europe or in the Mediterranean basin. Although Damascus has always had good political relations with Moscow, trade between the two only became significant after the outbreak of protests in 2011. Charap, Samuel, Elina Treyger, and Edward Geist, Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center, Entrepreneurship in America: Challenges and Opportunities, Updating Personnel Vetting and Security Clearance Guidelines for Future Generations, Book Review: 'Liberalism, the Blob, and American Foreign Policy: Evidence and Methodology' by Robert Jervis. Russia is unlikely to intervene on a scale comparable to the 2015 action in Syria in any of the other three countries examined in the report—Libya, Yemen, and Afghanistan. This prompted it to preserve a permanent presence for its fleets in the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, where the Syrian cities of Tartus and Latakia are its only outlets. This motivated Moscow to establish its own anti-IS alliance within the region of Syria under the regime’s control, opposed to the “illegal” alliance that is built on “false foundations” because it excludes Assad. Check your email for details on your request. In his recent speech at the United Nations General Assembly, President Vladimir Putin of Russia defended Russia’s military role in Syria as an obligation to fight the Islamic State that “was initially forged as a tool against undesirable secular regimes” and is now “seeking dominance in the Islamic world.” Two days after Putin’s speech, Russia launched its first air strikes in Syria, which the Russian Orthodox Church called a “holy battle” that recalls the suffering of Christians in the region. In July, the Russian Union of Gas and Oil Industrialists also announced that after “the situation becomes stable” in Syria it seeks to invest at least $1.6 billion into energy contracts. The drivers for such an action are currently absent. Russia and Iran are allies in Syria not out of mutual sympathy, but for pragmatic reasons. Intervention short of the direct, overt use of the military seen in Syria in 2015, but greater than mere diplomacy, requires that the conflict in question present a high level of threat (as in Afghanistan), promise significant geopolitical benefits (as in Libya), or demonstrate moderate levels of both (as in Syria pre-2015). Russian operational objectives were suited to its strategy: make decisive gains where possible, fragment the Syrian opposition, and seek to parlay victories in Syria into broader political objectives with the United States. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. Putin has three objectives in Syria, and fighting ISIL is the least important of the three. In fact, the Kremlin has a broader objective: to send the message that popular revolts aimed at overthrowing Russian … RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. Candidate, Pardee RAND Graduate School, Assistant Policy Researcher; Ph.D. The resilience of the Syrian people is inspirational and, hopefully, with strategic aid from Russia, China, Iran and others, the nation will in time be restored despite the cruel vindictiveness of Western … On 18 January, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Russia would neutralise any threats from Damascus that Israel perceives to its security. Recent air strikes come as Moscow moves away from the “conservative” military doctrine that prevailed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Russia reduced its defense budget from 30 percent of GDP to about 4.5 percent. The situation changed after September 2015 when Russia, upon President Assad's request, began a military campaign in Syria against militants from Islamic State, who had taken control of large swathes of the country. Washington supports them, massacring civilians instead, along with destroying vital infrastructure. The OPCW, so vital in the Skripal case, has since been drawn in to reviewing the Syria attack – and almost all mention of Russia’s culpability in Skripal’s poisoning has disappeared from view. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. This report is part of the RAND Corporation research report series. The Pardee RAND Graduate School (PRGS.edu) is the largest public policy Ph.D. program in the nation and the only program based at an independent public policy research organization—the RAND Corporation. Russia has quite the mess on its hands in Syria and any hope of a clean exit from the country is far-fetched. The U.S. military should expect Russian forces, even if only covertly or in low numbers, to be present in nearly any conflict zone in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond. Several incidents suggest that the Assad regime—while closely coordinating military and diplomatic moves with Russia—has not fully submitted to Russia’s vision on the conflict and rejected a number of Moscow’s political demands. If it wants to be able to play a role in the Syrian conflict, Moscow believes its only choice is to support Assad militarily and forgo political solutions, which the Syrian regime has excelled at thwarting. Russia Vows 'Solidarity' with Syria, Conducts One of War's Deadliest Strikes. Russia may be hoping that its military presence and economic projects in Syria will increase the Syrian regime’s dependency on Moscow, which would have greater influence on the regime’s political and military decisions. This provides a good opportunity for an overview.There has been no increase in the forces Russia has deployed in Syria since the start of the campaign there. Assistant Policy Researcher, RAND; Ph.D. Russia has not won conclusively in Syria, but may not need to in order to achieve its objectives. It is a Russian naval base that was built in 1971 in Tartus, Syria. The Russian military presence in Syria can also help it strengthen the countries’ current modest economic ties and establish long-term ones. In response to the media hype accompanying its recent military intervention in Syria, Moscow has once again reverted to talk of protecting the Syrian state and religious minorities against terrorism and foreign-backed jihadi groups. You are leaving the website for the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy and entering a website for another of Carnegie's global centers. Arguably, if the analytical community had more effectively understood Russia’s interests, objectives… … This proposal also allows for Washington to reduce its commitment to Syria. U.S. civilian and military decisionmakers should assume that Russia will not refrain from getting involved in any conflict that affects its interests. By engaging in Syria, Russia has gained influence across the region. Russia does not conceal its tendency to challenge what it describes as Western attempts to “dominate global affairs,” most recently in Syria and Ukraine. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Regime preservation in Damascus is a core Russian objective that enables Russia to cement its foothold in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean Sea while simultaneously expanding its influence through partnerships with Iran and the Iranian network of regional proxies.

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